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Abstract. Manipulation is a problem of fundamental importance in the
context of voting in which the voters exercise their votes strategically in-
stead of voting honestly to prevent selection of an alternative that is less
preferred. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that there is no
strategy-proof voting rule that simultaneously satisfies certain combina-
tions of desirable properties. Researchers have attempted to get around
the impossibility results in several ways such as domain restriction and
computational hardness of manipulation. However these approaches have
been shown to have limitations. Since prevention of manipulation seems
to be elusive, an interesting research direction therefore is detection of
manipulation. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of detection of
possible manipulators in an election.
We formulate two pertinent computational problems - Coalitional Pos-
sible Manipulators (CPM) and Coalitional Possible Manipulators given
Winner (CPMW), where a suspect group of voters is provided as input
to compute whether they can be a potential coalition of possible manipu-
lators. In the absence of any suspect group, we formulate two more com-
putational problems namely Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search
(CPMS), and Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search given Winner
(CPMSW). We provide polynomial time algorithms for these problems,
for several popular voting rules. For a few other voting rules, we show that
these problems are in NP-complete. We observe that detecting manipu-
lation maybe easy even when manipulation is hard, as seen for example,
in the case of the Borda voting rule.
Keywords: Computational social choice, voting, manipulation, detection
1. INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
On many occasions, agents need to agree upon a common decision although they
have different preferences over the available alternatives. A natural approach
used in these situations is voting. Some classic examples of the use of voting rules
in the context of multiagent systems are in collaborative filtering [Pennock et al.,
2000], rank aggregation in web [Dwork et al., 2001] etc.
In a typical voting scenario, we have a set of m candidates and a set of n vot-
ers reporting their rankings of the candidates called their preferences or votes.
A voting rule selects one candidate as the winner once all the voters provide
their votes. A set of votes over a set of candidates along with a voting rule is
called an election. A basic problem with voting rules is that the voters may vote
strategically instead of voting honestly, leading to the selection of a candidate
which is not the actual winner. We call a candidate actual winner if, it wins the
election when every voter votes truthfully. This phenomenon of strategic vot-
ing is called manipulation in the context of voting. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite
(G-S) theorem [Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975] says that manipulation is
unavoidable for any unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule if we have at
least three candidates. A voting rule is called unanimous if whenever any can-
didate is most preferred by all the voters, such a candidate is the winner. A
voting rule is called non-dictatorial if there does not exist any voter whose most
preferred candidate is always the winner irrespective of the votes of other vot-
ers. The problem of manipulation is particularly relevant for multiagent systems
since agents have computational power to determine strategic votes. There have
been several attempts to bypass the impossibility result of the G-S theorem.
Economists have proposed domain restriction as a way out of the impossibil-
ity implications of the G-S theorem. The G-S theorem assumes all possible pref-
erence profiles as the domain of voting rules. In a restricted domain, it has been
shown that we can have voting rules that are not vulnerable to manipulation.
A prominent restricted domain is the domain of single peaked preferences, in
which the median voting rule provides a satisfactory solution [Mas-Collel et al.,
1995]. To know more about other domain restrictions, we refer to [Gaertner,
2001, Mas-Collel et al., 1995]. This approach of restricting the domain, however,
suffers from the requirement that the social planner needs to know the domain
of preference profiles of the voters, which is often impractical.
1.1 Related Work
Researchers in computational social choice theory have proposed invoking com-
putational intractability of manipulation as a possible work around for the G-S
theorem. Bartholdi et al. [Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991, Bartholdi et al., 1989] first
proposed the idea of using computational hardness as a barrier against manip-
ulation. Bartholdi et al. defined and studied the computational problem called
manipulation where a set of manipulators have to compute their votes that make
their preferred candidate win the election. The manipulators know the votes of
the truthful voters and the voting rule that will be used to compute the winner.
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Following this, a large body of research [Conitzer et al., 2007, Davies et al., 2011,
Dey and Narahari, 2014, Elkind and Erde´lyi, 2012, Elkind and Lipmaa, 2005,
Faliszewski et al., 2010, 2013, 2014, Gaspers et al., 2013, Narodytska and Walsh,
2013, Narodytska et al., 2011, Obraztsova and Elkind, 2012, Obraztsova et al.,
2011, Xia et al., 2010, 2009, Zuckerman et al., 2011] shows that the manipula-
tion problem is in NP-complete (NPC) for many voting rules. However, Procaccia
et al. [Procaccia and Rosenschein, 2006, 2007] showed average case easiness of
manipulation assuming junta distribution over the voting profiles. Friedgut et
al. [Friedgut et al., 2008] showed that any neutral voting rule which is suffi-
ciently far from being dictatorial is manipulable with non-negligible probabil-
ity at any uniformly random preference profile by a uniformly random prefer-
ence. The above result holds for elections with three candidates only. A voting
rule is called neutral if the names of the candidates are immaterial. Isaksson
et al. [Isaksson et al., 2012] generalize the above result to any number of can-
didates. Walsh [Walsh, 2010] empirically shows ease of manipulating an STV
(single transferable vote) election – one of the very few voting rules where ma-
nipulation even by one voter is in NPC [Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991]. In addition
to the results mentioned above, there exist many other results in the litera-
ture that emphasize the weakness of considering computational complexity as a
barrier [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2006, Faliszewski and Procaccia, 2010, Walsh,
2011, Xia and Conitzer, 2008b,c]. Hence, the barrier of computational hardness
is ineffective against manipulation in many settings.
1.2 Motivation
In a situation where multiple attempts for prevention of manipulation fail to
provide a fully satisfactory solution, detection of manipulation is a natural next
step of research. There have been scenarios where establishing the occurrence
of manipulation is straightforward, by observation or hindsight. For example,
in sport, there have been occasions where the very structure of the rules of the
game have encouraged teams to deliberately lose their matches. Observing such
occurrences in, for example, football (the 1982 FIFA World Cup football match
played between West Germany and Austria) and badminton (the quarter-final
match between South Korea and China in the London 2012 Olympics), the
relevant authorities have subsequently either changed the rules of the game (as
with football) or disqualified the teams in question (as with the badminiton
example). The importance of detecting manipulation lies in the potential for
implementing corrective measures in the future. For reasons that will be evident
soon, it is not easy to formally define the notion of manipulation detection.
Assume that we have the votes from an election that has already happened. A
voter is potentially a manipulator if there exists a preference ≻, different from
the voter’s reported preference, which is such that the voter had an “incentive
to deviate” from the former. Specifically, suppose the candidate who wins with
respect to this voter’s reported preference is preferred (in ≻) over the candidate
who wins with respect to≻. In such a situation,≻ could potentially be the voter’s
truthful preference, and the voter could be refraining from being truthful because
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an untruthful vote leads to a more favorable outcome with respect to ≻. Note
that we do not (and indeed, cannot) conclusively suggest that a particular voter
has manipulated an election. This is because the said voter can always claim
that she voted truthfully; since her actual preference is only known to her, there
is no way to prove or disprove such a claim. Therefore, we are inevitably limited
to asking only whether or not a voter has possibly manipulated an election.
Despite this technical caveat, it is clear that efficient detection of manipula-
tion, even if it is only possible manipulation, is potentially of interest in practice.
We believe that, the information whether a certain group of voters have possi-
bly manipulated an election or not would be very useful to social planners. For
example, the organizers of an event, say London 2012 Olympics, maybe very
interested to have this information. Also, in settings where data from many
past elections (roughly over a fixed set of voters) is readily available, it is con-
ceivable that possible manipulation could serve as suggestive evidence of real
manipulation. Aggregate data about possible manipulations, although formally
inconclusive, could serve as an important evidence of real manipulation. We re-
mark that having a rich history is typically not a problem, particularly for AI
related applications, since the data generated from an election is normally kept
for future requirements (for instance, for data mining or learning). For exam-
ple, several past affirmatives for possible manipulation is one possible way of
formalizing the notion of erratic past behavior. Also, applications where benefit
of doubt maybe important, for example, elections in judiciary systems, possi-
ble manipulation detection seems useful. Thus the computational problem of
detecting possible manipulation is of definite interest in this setting.
1.3 Contributions
The novelty of this paper is in initiating research on detection of possible ma-
nipulators in elections. We formulate four pertinent computational problems in
this context:
– CPM: In the coalitional possible manipulators problem, we are interested in
whether or not a given subset of voters is a possible coalition of manipulators
[Definition 4].
– CPMW: The coalitional possible manipulators given winner is the CPM
problem with the additional information about who the winner would have
been if the possible manipulators had all voted truthfully [Definition 2].
– CPMS, CPMSW: In CPMS (Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search), we
want to know, whether there exists any coalition of possible manipulators
of a size at most k [Definition 6]. Similarly, we define CPMSW (Coalitional
Possible Manipulators Search given Winner) [Definition 5].
Our specific findings are as follows.
– We show that all the four problems above, for scoring rules and the max-
imin voting rule, are in P when the coalition size is one [Theorem 1 and
Theorem 4].
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– We show that all the four problems, for any coalition size, are in P for a
wide class of scoring rules which include the Borda voting rule [Theorem 2,
Theorem 3 and Corollary 1].
– We show that, for the Bucklin voting rule [Theorem 6], both the CPM and
CPMW problems are in P. The CPMS and CPMSW problems for the Buck-
lin voting rule are also in P, when we have maximum possible coalition size
k = O(1).
– We show that both the CPM and the CPMW problems are in NPC for the
STV voting rule [Theorem 7 and Corollary 2]. We also prove that the CPMW
problem is in NPC for maximin voting rule [Theorem 5].
We observe that all the four problems are computationally easy for many voting
rules that we study in this paper. This can be taken as a positive result. The
results for the CPM and the CPMW problems are summarized in Table 1.
Voting Rule CPM,c = 1 CPM CPMW,c = 1 CPMW
Scoring Rules P ? P ?
Borda P P P P
k-approval P P P P
Maximin P ? P NPC
Bucklin P P P P
STV NPC NPC NPC NPC
Table 1. Results for CPM and CPMW (c denotes coalition size). The ‘?’ mark means
that the problem is open.
This paper is a significant extension of the conference version of this
work Dey et al. [2015]: this extended version includes all the proofs.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the
necessary preliminaries in Section 2; we formally define the computational prob-
lems in Section 3; we present the results in Section 4 and finally we conclude in
Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of all voters and C = {c1, . . . , cm} the set of all
candidates. Each voter vi’s vote is a preference ≻i over the candidates which is
a linear order over C. For example, for two candidates a and b, a ≻i b means
that the voter vi prefers a to b. We will use a >i b to denote the fact that
5
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a ≻i b, a 6= b. We denote the set of all linear orders over C by L(C). Hence, L(C)
n
denotes the set of all n-voters’ preference profile (≻1, · · · ,≻n). We denote the
(n − 1)-voters’ preference profile by (≻1, · · · ,≻i−1,≻i+1, · · · ,≻n) by ≻−i. We
denote the set {1, 2, 3, . . .} by N+. The power set of C is denoted by 2C, and ∅
denotes the empty set. A map rc : ∪n,|C|∈N+L(C)
n −→ 2C \ {∅} is called a voting
correspondence. A map t : ∪|C|∈N+2
C \ {∅} −→ C is called a tie breaking rule.
Commonly used tie breaking rules are lexicographic tie breaking rules where ties
are broken according to a predetermined preference ≻t∈ L(C). A voting rule is
r = t ◦ rc, where ◦ denotes composition of mappings. Given an election E, we
can construct a weighted graph GE called weighted majority graph from E. The
set of vertices in GE is the set of candidates in E. For any two candidates x
and y, the weight on the edge (x, y) is DE(x, y) = NE(x, y) − NE(y, x), where
NE(x, y)(respectively NE(y, x)) is the number of voters who prefer x to y (re-
spectively y to x). Some examples of common voting correspondences are as
follows.
– Positional scoring rules: Given an m-dimensional vector α =
(α1, α2, . . . , αm) ∈ Rm with α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm and α1 > αm, we can
naturally define a voting rule - a candidate gets score αi from a vote if it is
placed at the ith position, and the score of a candidate is the sum of the scores
it receives from all the votes. The winners are the candidates with maximum
score. A scoring rule is called a strict scoring rule if α1 > α2 > · · · > αm.
For α = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0), we get the Borda voting rule. With αi = 1
∀i ≤ k and 0 else, the voting rule we get is known as the k-approval voting
rule. The plurality voting rule is the 1-approval voting rule and the veto
voting rule is the (m− 1)-approval voting rule.
– Maximin: The maximin score of a candidate x is miny 6=xD(x, y). The win-
ners are the candidates with maximum maximin score.
– Bucklin: A candidate x’s Bucklin score is the minimum number l such that
at least half of the voters rank x in their top l positions. The winners are
the candidates with lowest Bucklin score. This voting rule is also sometimes
referred as the simplified Bucklin voting rule.
– Single Transferable Vote: In Single Transferable Vote (STV), a candidate
with least plurality score is dropped out of the election and its votes are
transferred to the next preferred candidate. If two or more candidates receive
least plurality score, then some predetermined tie breaking rule is used. The
candidate that remains after (m− 1) rounds is the winner.
3 Problem Formulation
Consider an election that has already happened in which all the votes are known
and thus the winner x ∈ C is also known. We call the candidate x the current
winner of the election. The authority may suspect that the voters belonging
to M ⊂ V have formed a coalition among themselves and manipulated the
election by voting non-truthfully. The authority believes that other voters who
do not belong toM , have voted truthfully. We denote the coalition size |M | by c.
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Suppose the authority has auxiliary information, maybe from some other sources,
which says that the actual winner should have been some candidate y ∈ C other
than x. We call a candidate actual winner if it wins the election where all the
voters vote truthfully. This means that the authority thinks that, had the voters
in M voted truthfully, the candidate y would have been the winner. We remark
that there are practical situations, for example, 1982 FIFA World cup or 2012
London Olympics, where the authority knows the actual winner. This situation
is formalized below.
Definition 1. Let r be a voting rule, and (≻i)i∈V be a voting profile of a set
V of n voters. Let x be the winning candidate with respect to r for this profile.
For a candidate y 6= x, M ⊂ V is said to be a coalition of possible manipulators
against y with respect to r if there exists a |M |-voters’ profile (≻′j)j∈M ∈ L(C)
|M|
such that x ≻′j y, ∀j ∈M , and further, r((≻j)j∈V\M , (≻
′
i)i∈M ) = y.
Using the notion of coalition of possible manipulators, we formulate a
computational problem called Coalitional Possible Manipulators given Winner
(CPMW) as follows.
Definition 2. (CPMW Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a preference profile (≻i)i∈V of a set of voters V over a set
of candidates C, a subset of voters M ⊂ V, and a candidate y, determine if M
is a coalition of possible manipulators against y with respect to r.
In the CPMW problem, the actual winner is given in the input. However, it
may very well happen that the authority does not have any other information
to guess the actual winner - the candidate who would have won the election had
the voters in M voted truthfully. In this situation, the authority is interested in
knowing whether there is a |M |-voter profile which along with the votes in V \M
makes some candidate y ∈ C the winner who is different from the current winner
x ∈ C and all the preferences in the |M |-voters’ profile prefer x to y. If such a
|M |-voter profile exists for the subset of voters M , then we call M a coalition
of possible manipulators and the corresponding computational problem is called
Coalitional Possible Manipulators (CPM). These notions are formalized below.
Definition 3. Let r be a voting rule, and (≻i)i∈V be a voting profile of a set V
of n voters. A subset of voters M ⊂ V is called a coalition of possible manipula-
tors with respect to r if M is a coalition of possible manipulators against some
candidate y with respect to r.
Definition 4. (CPM Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a preference profile (≻i)i∈V of a set of voters V over a set
of candidates C, and a subset of voters M ⊂ V, determine if M is a coalition of
possible manipulators with respect to r.
In both the CPMW and CPM problems, a subset of voters which the au-
thority suspect to be a coalition of manipulators, is given in the input. However,
there can be situations where there is no specific subset of voters to suspect. In
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those scenarios, it may still be useful to know, what are the possible coalition of
manipulators of size less than some number k. Towards that end, we extend the
CPMW and CPM problems to search for a coalition of potential possible ma-
nipulators and call them Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search given Winner
(CPMSW) and Coalitional Possible Manipulators Search (CPMS) respective.
Definition 5. (CPMSW Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a preference profile (≻i)i∈V of a set of voters V over a set
of candidates C, a candidate y, and an integer k, determine whether there exists
any M ⊂ V with |M | ≤ k such that M is a coalition of possible manipulators
against y.
Definition 6. (CPMS Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a preference profile (≻i)i∈V of a set of voters V over a set
of candidates C, and an integer k, determine whether there exists any M ⊂ V
with |M | ≤ k such that M is a coalition of possible manipulators.
3.1 Discussion
The CPMW problem may look very similar to the manipulation prob-
lem [Bartholdi et al., 1989, Conitzer et al., 2007]- in both the problems a set
of voters try to make a candidate winner. However, in the CPMW problem, the
actual winner must be less preferred to the current winner. Although it may look
like a subtle difference, it changes the nature and complexity theoretic behavior
of the problem completely. For example, we show that all the four problems have
an efficient algorithm for a large class of voting rules that includes the Borda
voting rule for which the manipulation problem is in NPC, even when we have
at least two manipulators [Betzler et al., 2011, Davies et al., 2011]. Another im-
portant difference is that the manipulation problem, in contrast to the problems
studied in this paper, does not take care of manipulators’ preferences. We believe
that there does not exist any formal reduction between the CPMW problem and
the manipulation problem.
On the other hand, the CPMS problem is similar to the margin of victory
problem defined by Xia [Xia, 2012], where also we are looking for changing the
current winner by changing at most some k number of votes, which in turn
identical to the destructive bribery problem [Faliszewski et al., 2009]. Whereas,
in the CPMS problem, the vote changes can occur in a restricted fashion. Here
also, the margin of victory problem has the hereditary property which the CPMS
problem does not possess. These two problems do not seem to have any obvious
complexity theoretic implications.
Now, we explore the connections among the four problems that we study
here. Notice that, a polynomial time algorithm for the CPM and the CPMW
problems gives us a polynomial time algorithm for the CPMS and the CPMSW
problems for any maximum possible coalition size k = O(1). Also, observe that,
a polynomial time algorithm for the CPMW (respectively CPMSW) problem
implies a polynomial time algorithm for the CPM (respectively CPMS) problem.
Hence, we have the following propositions.
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Proposition 1. For every voting rule, if the maximum possible coalition size
k = O(1), then,
CPMW ∈ P⇒ CPM,CPMSW,CPMS ∈ P
Proposition 2. For every voting rule,
CPMSW ∈ P⇒ CPMS ∈ P
4 Results
In this section, we present our algorithmic results for the CPMW, CPM,
CPMSW, and CPMS problems for various voting rules.
4.1 Scoring Rules
Below we have certain lemmas which form a crucial ingredient of our algorithms.
To begin with, we define the notion of amanipulated preference. Let r be a scoring
rule and ≻:= (≻i,≻−i) be a voting profile of n voters. Let ≻′i be a preference
such that
r(≻) >′i r(≻
′
i,≻−i).
Then, we say that ≻′i is a (≻, i)-manipulated preference with respect to r. We
omit the reference to r if it is clear from the context.
Lemma 1. Let r be a scoring rule and ≻:= (≻i,≻−i) be a voting profile of n
voters. Let a and b be two candidates such that score≻−i(a) > score≻−i(b), and
let ≻′i be (≻, i)-manipulated preference where a precedes b:
≻′i:= · · · > a > · · · > b > · · ·
If a, b are not winners with respect to either (≻′i,≻−i) or ≻, then the preference
≻′′i obtained from ≻
′
i by interchanging a and b is also (≻, i)-manipulated.
Proof. Let x := r(≻′i,≻−i). If suffices to show that x continues to win in the
proposed profile (≻′′i ,≻−i). To this end, it is enough to argue the scores of a and
b with respect to x. First, consider the score of b in the new profile:
score(≻′′
i
,≻−i)(b) = score≻′′i (b) + score≻−i(b)
< score≻′
i
(a) + score≻−i(a)
= score(≻′
i
,≻−i)(a)
≤ score(≻′
i
,≻−i)(x)
= score(≻′′
i
,≻−i)(x) (1)
The second line uses the fact that score≻′′
i
(b) = score≻′
i
(a) and score≻−i(b) <
score≻−i(a). The fourth line comes from the fact that x is the winner and the
last line follows from the fact that the position of x is same in both profiles.
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Similarly, we have the following argument for the score of a in the new profile
(the second line below simply follows from the definition of scoring rules).
score(≻′′
i
,≻−i)(a) = score≻′′i (a) + score≻−i(a)
≤ score≻′
i
(a) + score≻−i(a)
= score(≻′
i
,≻−i)(a)
≤ score(≻′
i
,≻−i)(x)
= score(≻′′
i
,≻−i)(x) (2)
Since the tie breaking rule is according to some predefined fixed order ≻t∈ L(C)
and the candidates tied with winner in (≻′′i ,≻−i) also tied with winner in (≻
′
i
,≻−i), we have the following,
r(≻) >′′i r(≻
′′
i ,≻−i)
⊓⊔
We now show that, if there is some (≻, i)-manipulated preference with respect
to a scoring rule r, then there exists a (≻, i)-manipulated preference with a
specific structure.
Lemma 2. Let r be a scoring rule and ≻:= (≻i,≻−i) be a voting profile of
n voters. If there is some (≻, i)-manipulated preference with respect to r, then
there also exists a (≻, i)-manipulated preference ≻′i where the actual winner y
immediately follows the current winner x:
≻′i:= · · · > x > y > · · ·
and the remaining candidates are in nondecreasing ordered of their scores from
≻−i.
Proof. Let ≻′′ be a (≻, i)-manipulated preference with respect to r. Let x := r(≻
), y := r(≻′′,≻−i). From Lemma 1, without loss of generality, we may assume
that, all candidates except x, y are in nondecreasing order of score≻−i(.) in the
preference ≻′′. If ≻′′i := · · · ≻ x ≻ · · · ≻ y ≻ · · · ≻ · · · , we define ≻
′
i:= · · · ≻
x ≻ y ≻ · · · ≻ · · · from ≻′′i where y is moved to the position following x and
the position of the candidates in between x and y in ≻′′i is deteriorated by one
position each. The position of the rest of the candidates remain same in both
≻′′i and ≻
′
i. Now we have following,
score(≻′
i
,≻−i)(y) = score≻′i(y) + score≻−i(y)
≥ score≻′′
i
(y) + score≻−i(y)
= score(≻′′
i
,≻−i)(y) (1)
We also have,
score(≻′
i
,≻−i)(a) ≤ score(≻′′i ,≻−i)(a), ∀a ∈ C \ {y} (2)
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Since the tie breaking rule is according to some predefined order ≻t∈ L(C), we
have the following,
r(≻) >′i r(≻
′,≻−i)
⊓⊔
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we now present the results for the scoring rules.
Theorem 1. When c=1, the CPMW, CPM, CPMSW, and CPMS problems for
scoring rules are in P.
Proof. From Proposition 1, it is enough to give a polynomial time algorithm for
the CPMW problem. So consider the CPMW problem. We are given the actual
winner y and we compute the current winner x with respect to r. Let ≻[j] be a
preference where x and y are in positions j and (j+1) respectively, and the rest
of the candidates are in nondecreasing order of the score that they receive from
≻−i. For j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1}, we check if y wins with the profile (≻−i,≻[j]). If
we are successful with at least one j we report YES, otherwise we say NO. The
correctness follows from Lemma 2. Thus we have a polynomial time algorithm
for CPMW when c = 1 and the theorem follows from Proposition 1. ⊓⊔
Now, we study the CPMW and the CPM problems when c > 1. If m = O(1),
then both the CPMW and the CPM problems for any anonymous and efficient
voting rule r can be solved in polynomial time by iterating over all possible(
m!+c−1
m!
)
ways the manipulators can have actual preferences. A voting rule is
called efficient if winner determination under it is in P.
Theorem 2. For scoring rules with α1 − α2 ≤ αi − αi+1, ∀i, the CPMW and
the CPM problems are in P.
Proof. We provide a polynomial time algorithm for the CPMW problem in this
setting. Let x be the current winner and y be the given actual winner. Let
M be the given subset of voters. Let ((≻i)i∈M , (≻j)j∈V \M ) be the reported
preference profile. Without loss of generality, we assume that x is the most
preferred candidate in every ≻i, i ∈M . Let us define ≻′i, i ∈M, by moving y to
the second position in the preference ≻i. In the profile ((≻′i)i∈M , (≻j)j∈V \M ),
the winner is either x or y since only y’s score has increased. We claim thatM is a
coalition of possible manipulators with respect to y if and only if y is the winner
in preference profile ((≻′i)i∈M , (≻j)j∈V \M ). This can be seen as follows. Suppose
there exist preferences ≻′′i , with x ≻
′′
i y, i ∈ M, for which y wins in the profile
((≻′′i )i∈M , (≻j)j∈V \M ). Now without loss of generality, we can assume that y
immediately follows x in all ≻′′i , i ∈ M, and α1 − α2 ≤ αi − αi+1, ∀i implies
that we can also assume that x and y are in the first and second positions
respectively in all ≻′′i , i ∈ M . Now in both the profiles, ((≻
′
i)i∈M , (≻j)j∈V \M )
and ((≻′′i )i∈M , (≻j)j∈V \M ), the score of x and y are same. But in the first profile
x wins and in the second profile y wins, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3. For scoring rules with α1 − α2 ≤ αi − αi+1, ∀i, the CPMSW and
the CPMS problems are in P.
11
4. RESULTS
Proof. From Proposition 2, it is enough to prove that CPMSW ∈ P . Let x
be the current winner, y be the given actual winner and s(x) and s(y) be their
current respective scores. For each vote v ∈ V , we compute a number ∆(v) =
α2 − αj − α1 + αi, where x and y are receiving scores αi and αj respectively
from the vote v. Now, we output yes iff there are k votes vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k such
that,
∑k
i=1∆(vi) ≥ s(x) − s(y), which can be checked easily by sorting the
∆(v)’s in nonincreasing order and checking the condition for the first k ∆(v)’s,
where k is the maximum possible coalition size specified in the input. The proof
of correctness follows by exactly in the same line of argument as the proof of
Theorem 2. ⊓⊔
For the plurality voting rule, we can solve all the problems easily using max
flow. Hence, from Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we have the following result.
Corollary 1. The CPMW, CPM, CPMSW, and CPMS problems for the Borda
and k-approval voting rules are in P.
4.2 Maximin Voting Rule
For the maximin voting rule, we show that all the four problems are in P, when
we have a coalition size of one to check for.
Theorem 4. The CPMW, CPM, CPMSW, and CPMS problems for maximin
voting rule are in P for coalition size c = 1 or maximum possible coalition size
k = 1.
Proof. Given a n-voters’ profile ≻∈ L(C)n and a voter vi, let the current winner
be x := r(≻) and the given actual winner be y. We will construct ≻′= (≻′i,≻−i),
if it exists, such that r(≻) >′i r(≻
′) = y, thus deciding whether vi is a possible
manipulator or not. Now, the maximin score of x and y in the profile ≻′ can
take one of values from the set {score≻−i(x) ± 1} and {score≻−i(y) ± 1}. The
algorithm is as follows. We first guess the maximin score of x and y in the profile
≻′. There are only four possible guesses. Suppose, we guessed that x’s score
will decrease by one and y’s score will decrease by one assuming that this guess
makes y win. Now notice that, without loss of generality, we can assume that y
immediately follows x in the preference ≻′i since y is the winner in the profile
≻′. This implies that there are only O(m) many possible positions for x and y
in ≻′i. We guess the position of x and thus the position of y in ≻
′
i. Let B(x)
and B(y) be the sets of candidates with whom x and respectively y performs
worst. Now since, x’s score will decrease and y’s score will decrease, we have the
following constraint on ≻′i. There must be a candidate each from B(y) and B(x)
that will precede x. We do not know a-priori if there is one candidate that will
serve as a witness for both B(x) and B(y), or if there separate witnesses. In the
latter situation, we also do not know what order they appear in. Therefore we
guess if there is a common candidate, and if not, we guess the relative ordering
of the distinct candidates from B(x) and B(y). Now we place any candidate at
the top position of ≻′i if this action does not make y lose the election. If there
12
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are many choices, we prioritize in favor of candidates from B(x) and B(y) — in
particular, we focus on the candidates common to B(x) and B(y) if we expect
to have a common witness, otherwise, we favor a candidate from one of the sets
according to the guess we start with. If still there are multiple choices, we pick
arbitrarily. After that we move on to the next position, and do the same thing
(except we stop prioritizing explicitly for B(x) and B(y) once we have at least
one witness from each set). The other situations can be handled similarly with
minor modifications. In this way, if it is able to get a complete preference, then
it checks whether vi is a possible manipulator or not using this preference. If yes,
then it returns YES. Otherwise, it tries other positions for x and y and other
possible scores of x and y. After trying all possible guesses, if it cannot find the
desired preference, then it outputs NO. Since there are only polynomial many
possible guesses, this algorithm runs in a polynomial amount of time. The proof
of correctness follows from the proof of Theorem 1 in [Bartholdi et al., 1989]. ⊓⊔
We now show that the CPMW problem for maximin voting rule is in NPC
when we have c > 1. Towards that, we use the fact that the unweighted coalitional
manipulation (UCM) problem for maximin voting rule is in NPC [Xia et al.,
2009], when we have c > 1. The UCM problem is as follows.
Definition 7. (UCM Problem)
Given a voting rule r, a set of manipulators M ⊂ V, a profile of non-
manipulators’ vote (≻i)i∈V\M , and a candidate z ∈ C, we are asked whether
there exists a profile of manipulators’ votes (≻′j)j∈M such that r((≻i)i∈V\M , (≻
′
j
)j∈M ) = z. Assume that ties are broken in favor of z.
We define a restricted version of the UCM problem called R-UCM as follows.
Definition 8. (R-UCM Problem)
This problem is the same as the UCM problem with a given guarantee - let
c := |M |. The candidate z loses pairwise election with every other candidate
by 4c votes. For any two candidates a, b ∈ C, either a and b ties or one wins
pairwise election against the other one by margin of either 2c+ 2 or of 4c or of
8c. We denote the margin by which a candidate a defeats b, by d(a, b).
The R-UCM problem for maximin voting rule is in NPC [Xia et al., 2009],
when we have c > 1. We will need the following lemma to manipulate the pairwise
difference scores in the reduction. The lemma has been used before [McGarvey,
1953, Xia and Conitzer, 2008a].
Lemma 3. For any function f : C × C −→ Z, such that
1. ∀a, b ∈ C, f(a, b) = −f(b, a).
2. ∀a, b ∈ C, f(a, b) is even,
there exists a n voters’ profile such that for all a, b ∈ C, a defeats b with a margin
of f(a, b). Moreover,
n = O

 ∑
{a,b}∈C×C
|f(a, b)|


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Theorem 5. The CPMW problem for maximin voting rule is in NPC, for c > 1.
Proof. Clearly the CPMW problem for maximin voting rule is in NP. We provide
a many-one reduction from the R-UCM problem for the maximin voting rule to
it. Given a R-UCM problem instance, we define a CPMW problem instance
Γ = (C′, (≻′i)i∈V′ ,M
′) as follows.
C′ := C ∪ {w, d1, d2, d3}
We define V ′ such that d(a, b) is the same as the R-UCM instance, for all a, b ∈ C
and d(d1, w) = 2c+2, d(d1, d2) = 8c, d(d2, d3) = 8c, d(d3, d1) = 8c. The existence
of such a V ′ is guaranteed from Lemma 3. Moreover, Lemma 3 also ensures that
|V ′| is O(mc). The votes of the voters inM is w ≻ . . . . Thus the current winner is
w. The actual winner is defined to be z. The tie breaking rule is≻t= w ≻ z ≻ . . . ,
where z is the candidate whom the manipulators in M want to make winner in
the R-UCM problem instance. Clearly this reduction takes polynomial amount
of time. Now we show that, M is a coalition of possible manipulators iff z can
be made a winner.
The if part is as follows. Let ≻i, i ∈M be the votes that make z win. We can
assume that z is the most preferred candidate in all the preferences ≻i, i ∈ M .
Now consider the preferences for the voters in M is follows.
≻′i:= d1 ≻ d2 ≻ d3 ≻ w ≻i, i ∈M
The score of every candidate in C is not more than z. The score of z is −3c.
The score of w is −3c − 2 and the scores of d1, d2, and d3 are less than −3c.
Hence, M is a coalition of possible manipulators with the actual preferences
≻′i:= d1 ≻ d2 ≻ d3 ≻ w ≻i, i ∈M .
The only if part is as follows. Suppose M is a coalition of possible manipula-
tors with actual preferences ≻′i, i ∈ M . Consider the preferences ≻
′
i, i ∈ M , but
restricted to the set C only. Call them ≻i, i ∈M . We claim that ≻i, i ∈M with
the votes from V makes z win the election. If not then, there exists a candidate,
say a ∈ C, whose score is strictly more than the score of z - this is so because the
tie breaking rule is in favor of z. But this contradicts the fact that z wins the
election when the voters in M vote ≻′i, i ∈M along with the votes from V
′. ⊓⊔
4.3 Bucklin Voting Rule
In this subsection, we design polynomial time algorithms for both the CPMW
and the CPM problem for the Bucklin voting rule. Again, we begin by showing
that if there are profiles witnessing manipulation, then there exist profiles that
do so with some additional structure, which will subsequently be exploited by
our algorithm.
Lemma 4. Consider a preference profile (≻i)i∈V , where x is the winner with
respect to the Bucklin voting rule. Suppose a subset of voters M ⊂ V form a
coalition of possible manipulators. Let y be the actual winner. Then there exist
preferences (≻′i)i∈M such that y is a Bucklin winner in ((≻i)i∈V\M, (≻
′
i)i∈M ),
and further:
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1. y immediately follows x in each ≻′i.
2. The rank of x in each ≻′i is in one of the following - first, b(y) − 1, b(y),
b(y) + 1, where b(y) be the Bucklin score of y in ((≻i)i∈V\M, (≻
′
i)i∈M ).
Proof. From Definition 3, y’s rank must be worse than x’s rank in each ≻′i. We
now exchange the position of y with the candidate which immediately follows
x in ≻′i. This process does not decrease Bucklin score of any candidate except
possibly y’s, and x’s score does not increase. Hence y will continue to win and
thus ≻′i satisfies the first condition.
Now to begin with, we assume that ≻′i satisfies the first condition. If the
position of x in ≻′i is b(y)− 1 or b(y), we do not change it. If x is above b(y)− 1
in ≻′i, then move x and y at the first and second positions respectively. Similarly
if x is below b(y) + 1 in ≻′i, then move x and y at the b(y) + 1 and b(y) + 2
positions respectively. This process does not decrease score of any candidate
except y because the Bucklin score of x is at least b(y). The transformation
cannot increase the score y since its position has only been improved. Hence y
continues to win and thus ≻′i satisfies the second condition. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4 leads us to the following theorem.
Theorem 6. The CPMW problem and the CPM problems for Bucklin voting
rule are in P. Therefore, by Proposition 1, the CPMSW and the CPMS problems
are in P when the maximum coalition size k = O(1).
Proof. Proposition 1 says that it is enough to prove that the CPMW problem
is in P. Let x be the current winner and y be the given actual winner. For any
final Bucklin score b(y) of y, there are polynomially many possibilities for the
positions of x and y in the profile of ≻i, i ∈ M , since Bucklin voting rule is
anonymous. Once the positions of x and y is fixed, we try to fill the top b(y)
positions of each ≻′i - place a candidate in an empty position above b(y) in any
≻′i if doing so does not make y lose the election. If we are able to successfully fill
the top b(y) positions of all ≻′i for all i ∈ M , then M is a coalition of possible
manipulators. If the above process fails for all possible above mentioned positions
of x and y and all possible guesses of b(y), then M is not a coalition of possible
manipulators. Clearly the above algorithm runs in poly(m,n) time.
The proof of correctness is as follows. If the algorithm outputs that M is
a coalition of possible manipulators, then it actually has constructed ≻′i for all
i ∈M with respect to which they form a coalition of possible manipulators. On
the other hand, if they form a coalition of possible manipulators, then Lemma 4
ensures that our algorithm explores all the sufficient positions of x and y in ≻′i
for all i ∈ M . Now if M is a possible coalition of manipulators, then the corre-
sponding positions for x and y have also been searched. Our greedy algorithm
must find it since permuting the candidates except x and z which are ranked
above b(y) in ≻′i cannot stop y to win the election since the Bucklin score of
other candidates except y is at least b(y). ⊓⊔
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4.4 STV Voting Rule
Next, we prove that the CPMW and the CPM problems for STV rule is in NPC.
To this end, we reduce from the Exact Cover by 3-Sets Problem (X3C), which is
known to be in NPC [Garey and Johnson, 1979]. The X3C problem is as follows.
Definition 9. (X3C Problem)
Given a set S of cardinality n and m subsets S1, S2, . . . , Sm ⊂ S with |Si| =
3, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, does there exist an index set I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} with |I| = |S|3 such
that ∪i∈ISi = S.
Theorem 7. The CPM problem for STV rule is in NPC.
Proof sketch: It is enough to show the theorem for the case c = 1. Clearly the
problem is in NP. To show NP hardness, we show a many-one reduction from
the X3C problem to it. The reduction is analogous to the reduction given in
[Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991]. Hence, we give a proof sketch only. Given an X3C
instance, we construct an election as follows. The unspecified positions can be
filled in any arbitrary way. The candidate set is as follows.
C = {x, y} ∪ {a1, . . . , am} ∪ {a1, . . . , am}
∪ {b1, . . . , bm} ∪ {b1, . . . , bm}
∪ {d0, . . . , dn} ∪ {g1, . . . , gm}
The votes are as follows.
– 12m votes for y ≻ x ≻ . . .
– 12m− 1 votes for x ≻ y ≻ . . .
– 10m+ 2n3 votes for d0 ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . .
– 12m− 2 votes for di ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [n]
– 12m votes for gi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 6m+ 4i− 5 votes for bi ≻ bi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 2 votes for bi ≻ dj ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m], ∀j ∈ Si
– 6m+ 4i− 1 votes for bi ≻ bi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 2 votes for bi ≻ d0 ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 6m+ 4i− 3 votes for ai ≻ gi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 1 vote for ai ≻ bi ≻ gi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 2 votes for ai ≻ ai ≻ gi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 6m+ 4i− 3 votes for ai ≻ gi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 1 vote for ai ≻ bi ≻ gi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
– 2 votes for ai ≻ ai ≻ gi ≻ x ≻ y ≻ . . . , ∀i ∈ [m]
The tie breaking rule is ≻t= · · · ≻ x. The vote of v is x ≻ · · · . We claim that v
is a possible manipulator iff the X3C is a yes instance. Notice that, of the first
3m candidates to be eliminated, 2m of them are a1, . . . , am and a1, . . . , am. Also
exactly one of bi and bi will be eliminated among the first 3m candidates to be
eliminated because if one of bi, bi then the other’s score exceeds 12m. We show
that the winner is either x or y irrespective of the vote of one more candidate.
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Let J := {j : bj is eliminated before bj}. If J is an index of set cover then the
winner is y. This can be seen as follows. Consider the situation after the first
3m eliminations. Let i ∈ Sj for some j ∈ J . Then bj has been eliminated and
thus the score of di is at least 12m. Since J is an index of a set cover, every di’s
score is at least 12m. Notice that bj has been eliminated for all j /∈ J . Thus the
revised score of d0 is at least 12m. After the first 3m eliminations, the remaining
candidates are x, y, {di : i ∈ [n]}, {gi : i ∈ [m]}, {bj : j /∈ J}, {bj : j ∈ J}. All the
remaining candidates except x has score at least 12m and x’s score is 12m− 1.
Hence x will be eliminated next which makes y’s score at least 24m − 1. Next
di’s will get eliminated which will in turn make y’s score (12n + 36)m − 1. At
this point gi’s score is at most 32m. Also all the remaining bi and bi’s score is
at most 32m. Since each of the remaining candidate’s scores gets transferred to
y once they are eliminated, y is the winner.
Now we show that, if J is not an index of set cover then the winner is x. This
can be seen as follows. If |J | > n3 , then the number of bj that gets eliminated in
the first 3m iterations is less than m − n3 . This makes the score of d0 at most
12m− 2. Hence d0 gets eliminated before x and all its scores gets transferred to
x. This makes the elimination of x impossible before y and makes x the winner
of the election.
If |J | ≤ n3 and there exists an i ∈ S that is not covered by the corresponding
set cover, then di gets eliminated before x with a score of 12m− 2 and its score
gets transferred to x. This makes x win the election.
Hence y can win iff X3C is a yes instance. Also notice that if y can
win the election, then it can do so with the voter v voting a preference like
· · · ≻ x ≻ y ≻ · · · . 
From the proof of the above theorem, we have the following corollary by
specifying y as the actual winner for the CPMW problem.
Corollary 2. The CPMW problem for STV rule is in NPC.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have initiated a promising research direction for detecting ma-
nipulation in elections. We have proposed the notion of possible manipulation
and explored several concrete computational problems, which we believe to be
important in the context of voting theory. These problems involve identifying
if a given set of voters are possible manipulators (with or without a specified
candidate winner). We have also studied the search versions of these problems,
where the goal is to simply detect the presence of possible manipulation with
the maximum coalition size. We believe there is theoretical as well as practical
interest in studying the proposed problems. We have provided algorithms and
hardness results for many common voting rules.
In this work, we considered elections with unweighted voters only. An im-
mediate future research direction is to study the complexity of these problems
in weighted elections. Further, verifying the number of false manipulators that
17
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this model catches in a real or synthetic data set, where, we already have some
knowledge about the manipulators, would be interesting. It is our conviction
that both the problems that we have studied here have initiated an interesting
research direction with significant promise and potential for future work.
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